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Abstract
We consider an abstract setting of the differential r&d game, where participating
firms are allowed for strategic behavior. We assume the information asymmetry
across those firms and the government, which seeks to support newer technologies
in a socially optimal manner. We develop a general theory of robust subsidies under
such one-sided uncertainty and establish results on relative optimality, duration and
size of different policy tools available to the government. It turns out that there
might exist multiple sets of second-best robust policies, but there always exist a
naturally induced ordering across such sets, implying the optimal choice of a policy
exists for the government under different uncertainty levels.
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1 Introduction
For many environmental problems, a shift to green technologies is considered to be a
promising long-term solution. A prominent example is climate change, where much hope
rests on a transition from fossil fuel based technologies to renewable energy sources. An-
other example is traffic-related air pollution, where cleaner engines or e-mobility provide
opportunities to reduce pollution levels substantially.
In this context, a crucial question is whether and to what extent a government should
interfere with technological change. It is obvious that an internalization of environmental
externalities is important to provide incentives for developing clean technologies. Ar-
guably, competition among technologies will seek out the best technological solutions
once environmental damages are correctly priced. But many countries use considerably
more fine-grained approaches to steer details of technological change. A prominent exam-
ple are feed-in tariffs for renewables. By using different tariffs for different technologies,
many countries make sure that a broad set of technologies is developed and used. Often
this approach eliminates competition among technologies (as less efficient technologies are
subsidized to an extent that ensures their use) and thus replaces market-based technology
selection with politically set targets for technology development and diffusion. Subsidies
for different new transport technologies (fuel cells, e-mobility) work in a similar way.
Not surprisingly, many economists are skeptical regarding this approach and argue
that governments might lack the necessary information to ensure efficient investments in
different options for green technologies. However, there are also economic arguments in
favor of detailed incentive schemes. Numerous studies have shown that almost unavoidable
market failures can lead to a technology lock-in; typical examples are lock-ins caused by
market power that is due to patents for new technologies (see, e.g., Krysiak (2011)) or
externalities caused by network effects in technology adoption (see Arrow (1962), Arthur
(1989), (Unruh, 2000), or (Unruh, 2002)). In such cases, it is not sufficient to only set a
price for environmental damages to ensure that the best clean technologies are developed;
more specific incentives are necessary (Krysiak, 2011).
The size and duration of such specific interventions will typically depend strongly
on different cases of market failures. For example, the development of a new promising
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technology might only be delayed or it could be prevented completely, rendering different
interventions necessary.
However, in many cases it is not easy to assess the type and scope of market failures
that might require an intervention. This holds in particular, as the potential of yet to be
developed technologies cannot be predicted with certainty. It is often hard to say whether
a new technology is not developed, because market actors expect that it is an inferior
solution (and thus do not invest) or because some actors with incumbent technologies
use their power to forestall the development of a superior competition. Furthermore, it is
hard to assess whether a development is forestalled or only delayed.
In this paper, we investigate how qualitatively different types of market failures arising
in technological change require different policy actions. We use a fairly general model
where incumbent firms might or might not have an incentive to keep new technologies out
of the market or to delay its entrance. A government could, in addition to internalizing an
externality, provide specific support for the new technology. We show that different cases
of market failure can arise and require different levels and duration of an intervention. We
provide a set of general results on the multiplicity and ordering of potential subsidizing
schemes and elaborate on the criteria for selection of the most appropriate one. The
novelty of our approach is that it does not require any specific assumptions and is based
solely on the notion of the choice function over sets.
Robust control has been used in a number of applications in environmental and energy
economics. Studies on climate negotiations use robust optimization, as in (Babonneau
et al., 2013) or (Ben-Tal, El Ghaoui and Nemirovski, 2009). The robust control approach
has been used to investigate government interventions in environmental problems, in
particular related to the precautionary principle, as, for example, in (Athanassoglou and
Xepapadeas , 2012) or (Vardas and Xepapadeas, 2010). Other applications are found, for
example, in asset management, see (Vardas and Xepapadeas, 2015).
These studies are based on the minmax approach, where a planner tries to minimize a
threat and the realization of uncertain variables is chosen by a malevolent nature to max-
imize damages. One particularly interesting formal analysis of the robustness approach is
given by (Todorov, 2009), where a Kullback-Leibler entropy measure is used. Our analysis
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does not explicitly account for the minmax problem on behalf of the government, but the
results on robustness are still following the same pattern. In particular we answer the
question, what is the crucial level of noise (uncertainty) which makes a given policy rule
ineffective.
We contribute to this literature by using a generalized robustness approach, where the
robustness criteria naturally follows from the choice function over the set of outcomes.
The closest paper to our approach is (Brock et al., 2014), where the notion of hot spots is
introduced to mark the cases where uncertainty may break down the regulation or lead to
instability of the underlying system. Our approach is somewhat more general yet simpler
than in the aforementioned paper. The decision rules we develop are related to hotspots
type I and type III of that paper, but we do not elaborate on stochastic differential systems
and their treatment here by assuming r&d firms to be fully informed on capabilities of the
competitor. Our study is rather concentrated on obtaining the simplest possible policy
rules, separating qualitatively different outcomes.
We consider the problem where the government has limited information, which makes
it impossible to discern clearly what type of intervention is required. To gain insight
into this problem, we use a robustness approach, that is, we assume that the government
knows an upper and a lower boundary to the potential of the new technology, but it does
not know a probability distribution over possible potentials. Given this information, the
government aims to use a robust policy, that is, a policy that works well even in the most
adverse possible cases. Using this approach, we show that more extensive uncertainty will
lead to higher and longer subsidies for the new technology as long as an intervention still
remains rationale.
This analysis shows that there is indeed some economic rationale for a time-limited
intervention in the process of technological change, even if government cannot fully as-
certain what level and duration of support is required. In the following we set up the
abstract model, describe policy schemes necessary to prevent different types of lock-in
and obtain robust policy sets, evaluating associated welfare costs of uncertainty.
3
2 The model
In this paper we pursue the development of a general yet simple theory of robust decision
making on behalf of the social planner in the environment of one-sided uncertainty. We
thus need an underlying dynamics of the (fully informed) market participants which pro-
vide the information to social planner concerning the state of the economy. To specialize,
we study the underlying market as an r&d differential game in the spirit of (Ben-Youssef
and Zaccour, 2014), (Bondarev, 2014). We thus neglect any production side dynamics,
which can be easily incorporated as in (Krysiak, 2011).
In particular we assume that in the production sector, there is perfect competition
and final producers are price takers. In the r&d sector, the firms get a patent for their
developments and are thus monopolistic suppliers of their technology. Some of the firms
have an initial advantage (their technologies being somewhat more developed initially) and
thus might act strategically to forestall the use and development of the new technologies.
All r&d firms know with certainty technology characteristics of each other, but the
government experiences some uncertainty over the potential of some of the technologies
(the newer ones). The government may implement a subsidizing scheme to prevent the
strategic behavior of the more developed technology owners, but does so only if this is
welfare improving.
In our analysis we abstract from further market imperfections such as environmental
externalities, assuming it is already taken care about by proper remuneration schemes in
case technologies at hand are dirty and clean ones or both are green. By doing so we
apply our study to the case of general innovations setting with green technologies being
a specific (but rather important) example of those.
2.1 The general r&d game
In the r&d sector, there is a finite N ⊂ N number of firms. Each firm j ∈ N can invest
in r&d and set prices for its own technology. Owing to the patent, each firm is the sole
supplier of its technology, thus the market is monopolistically competitive one. We assume
the free entry condition with no sunk costs of entry.
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We assume the evolution of technology j may depend on own firm’s investments as
well as on investments of other firms and on the current state of own technology and
technologies of other firms:
∀j ∈ N : q˙j(t) = fj(qj(t), q−j(t), gj(t), g−j(t)), (1)
where we assume all fj are continuous in their arguments, −j index denotes all other
firms except j. The dynamics of all technologies (1) forms a controlled N -dimensional
ODE system.
The objective of every firm is to maximize its discounted stream of profits (value) for
a given discount rate r choosing optimally price schedule and investments:
Jj = max
pj ,gj
∫ ∞
0
e−rt {Πj(pj(t), qj(t), p−j(t), q−j(t))− cj(gj(t))} dt. (2)
where we additionally assume that profit of firm j, Πj may be a function of prices of all
firms as well as of technologies, but costs associated with development of technology j
depend only on firm’s j own investments (but can be heterogeneous across firms).
Given some final producers’ demand system
∀j ∈ N : QDj = Fj(pj,−j, qj,−j) (3)
for N firms present at the market, we get N reaction functions for prices of technologies
j and as a result an N -dimensional system for price schedules as functions of technology
states of all the firms, ∀j ∈ N : pj = wj(qj, q−j) where we assume only wj to be continuous
functions of qj,−j.
We thus reduce the problem of N firms given by (1), (2) to the differential game over
technologies states qj with controls gj. To keep the constructive nature of the exposition
we limit ourselves to open-loop solution concept, since closed loop one does not always
exist. As long as the controlled system (1) permits for the solution q∗j we denote
V ∗j = max
gj
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
Πj(pj(q
∗
j,−j), q
∗
j,−j(t), p−j(q
∗
j,−j))− cj(gj(q∗j,−j))
}
dt = V ∗j (qj,−j(0))
(4)
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value function of the firm j as a function of initial states of all technologies j ∈ N
with superscript ∗ denoting the simultaneous development regime (solution of N -players
differential game).
Without loss of generality we further denote O the set of all possible outcomes of this
game and by F the set of feasible outcomes (under given initial conditions and parameters
vectors). We note that these sets have finitely many elements as long as the number of
players N is finite. Examples of those elements are issues of strategic behaviour of one
or more firms on the market, leading to temporary/permanent prevention of entry of
new firms. We denote m ∈ O an arbitrary outcome of the r&d game and by qmj (t) the
state of technology j in regime m at time t. We further assume that there exist (unique)
equilibrium state vector ~qm of the r&d game, to which technologies converge in the long
run in regime m1.
2.2 Government
The government has the objective of maximizing the net social benefit from all the tech-
nologies. This net social benefit consists of a marginal benefit βj attached to each unit
of production with technology j minus locational costs, minus the costs of developing the
technologies. For simplicity, we assume that the social planner uses the same discount
rate r as the r&d firms. Social welfare is thus given by:
Wm :=
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
N∑
j=1
{
βjQ
m
j (t) (q
m
j (t) + Ξ
m
j (t))− cj
(
gmj (t)
)}
dt, (5)
where Ξj(t) denotes the average effect of used locations on output for technology j.
In general these are functions of prices and technologies’ states, pj,−j, qj,−j.
The government may use two policy instruments. First, there is the remuneration for
green production (measured by βj). Second, it might subsidize the initially disadvantaged
technologies for some time.
These instruments have to correct three market failures, two of which are well known.
First, without the remuneration, there would be no green production. Second, as r&d
1of course this vector may include infinite elements if some technologies do not have a steady state,
but we restrict the analysis to those cases one parameters’ space allow only for finite values of this vector.
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firms have market power, they will set socially suboptimal prices and thus green tech-
nologies will be used less than in the social optimum. Finally, the firms developing the
initially more advanced technologies might use their market power to set prices that keep
the other firms from investing into developing the newer technologies.
In this paper, we will focus on this third problem, because this is new and could be
particularly detrimental, as the development of a technology with high potential might
be prevented indefinitely. We thus directly consider the point raised in the introduc-
tion: Should a government only provide a general incentive for using green technologies
(such as a price for GHG emissions) or should it also steer technological change by using
technology-specific subsidies?
2.3 One-sided uncertainty
To investigate a setting that is both scientifically interesting and practically relevant, we
focus on the case, where the government knows initial technology vector ~q(0) which is
invariant across regimes of the game, but does not know the long-run potential of some of
the new technologies i ∈ I ⊂ N . Firms themselves are fully informed over characteristics
of both old and new technologies. This is often the case in real industries, since industry
players put more efforts into learning their competitors capabilities than the regulating
authority. Without loss of generality we further assume that at any moment there is
exactly one new technology i ∈ N which is entering the market and the planner does not
know its potential, but has some limited information about boundaries of this potential2.
Since we do not specify the dynamics of technologies, (1) we also restrain from specifying
where this uncertainty comes from. It is sufficient for our purposes to assume that at any
moment in time government knows the state of the new technology i with some certainty:
qi(t) ∈ [qi(t)− , qi(t) + ], ε iid∼ N (0, σε), σε = 2 (6)
2indeed this is not a binding assumption, since in the case of simultaneous entry of several firms
the problem may be decomposed into the sequence of problems with single entry, see discussion on the
sequence of pairwise games of the leader and the follower in Bondarev and Greiner (2017) and in the
current paper later in Sec. 3
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and the government is not able to learn the true state over time (otherwise the problem
becomes trivial).
As we will show, an increasing value of ε implies that the government is less able to
differentiate between different cases of strategic and non-strategic behavior of the incum-
bent firms and thus to ascertain that and how long a subsidy is required. We thus look
for a robust policy that can cope with several cases at once.
3 Analysis of the model
3.1 Characterization of the r&d game outcomes
We first characterize the multiplicity of outcomes of the underlying r&d game under full
information on behalf of competing firms. Once the solution for the game exists, it defines
the vector of value functions of participating firms as a function of initial states of all the
technologies, (4). Those firms, which have initial advantage, l ∈ N : ql(0) > qj(0) may
choose strategic behavior to keep competitors out of the market, creating the multiplicity
of outcomes. Whether or not such strategic behavior is optimal depends on comparison
of values generated by competitive and strategic behavior for every such firm l. Assume
for certainty there is a ranking of initial technologies states, such that:
q1(0) ≥ q2(0) ≥ .. ≥ qN(0) (7)
so that the firm 1 has initial advantage over all other firms and the next firm has advantage
over the rest of N − 2 firms, etc. Then firm 1 decides whether or not to implement
strategic pricing and at which level as following: it may set the price at the level p
S(1)
1
such that the profit for all other firms is zero if they enter the market and keep this
schedule for some time. If this turns to be not feasible or not profitable, it can set the
price at the level p
S(2)
1 as to keep all competitors except the closest one out of the market.
Continuation of this argument yields a descending sequence of strategic prices for firm 1,
p
S(1)
1 < p
S(2)
1 < .. < p
S(N)
1 such that the latest strategic price keeps off the market only the
firm N .
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If the first firm sets the strategic price p
S(i)
1 allowing for entrance of i < N firms, those
firms upon entrance may play the best response price or again act strategically. However
the leader under full information may predict actions of all the followers and sets the
strategic price effectively determining the number of competitors. We thus may reduce
the problem to the case of only two firms, since every next competitor just repeats the
decision process of preceding firms upon the strategic price setting.
We thus denote the incumbent firm A and the new entrant B. We do not specify
the number of potential strategic regimes other than assuming them to be finite. Denote
by Πmj the value generated by the outcome m of the underlying r&d game for the firm
j. Observe next that from the above discussion it follows that it is the leader (firm
with maximal initial state of technology) which defines the regime of the game. At last
note that value function of any firm j is a function of initial states of technologies and
parameters only. Denote by δ(0) = q1(0)− q2(0) the initial technological gap between the
leader and the closest competitor (potential entrant). Denote further by δjm(0){z} the
z-th root yielding to zero the difference in values generated by the game for the firm j
across outcomes i, j3.
We then have:
Proposition 1 (Algebraization of r&d game outcomes).
The outcome i ∈ F of the r&d game is individually optimal if for the leader j there exists
the choice function:
Θ(F) : δ(0) ∈:
⋃
m∈F
⋂
m∈F
[δjm(0){z}; δjm(0){z + 1}] :
Πij − Πmj ≥ 0 =⇒
Θ(F) = arg max
m∈M
Πmj = i. (8)
Proof. The proof simply follows from the defintion of value functions Πmj and the fact
that the choice function and the selector exist for any finite (and countable) collection of
arbitrary sets satisfying the axiom of choice.
3we assume the value functions of all potential regimes has finitely (or countably many) complex roots,
which is the case for any value function represented via some analytic function over δ(0)
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We now move to the uncertain part of the problem. Since government experiences
uncertainty over the true potential of technology B, it cannot assign the first-best subsidy
as usual4. We thus start with definition of social policy in our setup, then define social
optimality under uncertainty and work out what we call robust policy schemes preventing
strategic behavior.
3.2 Social welfare under uncertainty
We assume from now on initial level of technology A being fixed as well as other parameters
of the model except for qB(0), QB.
First we define the social optimality measure under robustness  for given qB
5:
Definition 1 (Social optimality under uncertainty).
The outcome m of the r&d game s ∈ O is (weakly) social welfare improving over the
outcome m with robustness level  if
∀ε ∈ [−, ] : min
ε∈[−,]
{W εs (qB)} ≥ min
ε∈[−,]
{W εm(qB)} (9)
it is strongly welfare improving if
∀ε ∈ [−, ] : min
ε∈[−,]
{W εs (qB)−W εm(qB)} ≥ 0 (10)
where W εs,m(qB) are given by integral Eq. (5) with QB = QB + ε.
The outcome s is (weakly) socially optimal with robustness level  if
∀ε ∈ [−, ],∀m ∈ O : arg max
m∈O
min
ε∈[−,]
{W εm(qB)} = s (11)
it is strongly welfare optimal if
∀ε ∈ [−, ],∀m ∈ O : arg max
m∈O
min
ε∈[−,]
{W εs (qB)−W εm(qB)} = s (12)
4in the first-best case the government plays a Stackelberg differential game being the first mover and
setting the subsidy size and duration such as to maximize social welfare
5We omit time argument in integral quantities W,Π and understand qB = qB(0), δ = δ(0) in what
follows if this does not lead to confusion.
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The definition of social optimality (11) requires to obtain minimum possible welfare
for every regime m over realization of the noise ε and then to take the maximum across
regimes. The regime which provides maximal welfare under the most unfavorable cir-
cumstances (minε) is socially optimal with certainty (robustness) level , if its minimum
strictly dominates other minima.
Strong optimality requires that regime s has higher welfare under the most unfavourable
circumstances then other regimes have under the most favourable ones, since min{x−y} =
min{x}−max{y}. Apparently the strong optimality holds if there are no intersections of
welfare functionals as functions of ε ∈ [±] and corresponds to the case when uncertainty
is inessential.
It is straightforward that under  → 0 the full certainty social welfare difference
minε{W εs (qB)} −minε{W εm(qB)} = Ws(qB)−Wm(qB) is recovered.
To establish social optimality it thus suffices to consider the differences in social welfare
across different regimes of the r&d game.
∀ ∈ O : Ds,m(W ) def= Ws(qB)−Wm(qB) (13)
and their robust counterparts as:
Ds,m(W )
def
= min
ε∈[−;]
{W εs (qB)} − min
ε∈[−;]
{W εm(qB)} (14)
The regime which is robust welfare optimal would yield positive differences with all
other regimes m, but we cannot apply max operator over these differences to select the
best outcome as in Def. 1.
To obtain such a procedure to select the socially optimal robust outcome we establish
the result concerning social welfare. To this end we make use of the algebraization tools
applied to the difference in minima, (14).
First observe that robust social welfare values, W m(qB) = minε∈[−;]{W εm(qB)} may be
treated as an analytic function in qB(0) since min operator gives a unique ε value, which
is simply
εm = arg min
ε∈[−;]
{W εm(qB)} (15)
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by the theorem on the average value of a function. However, these values are in general
different for different m, thus Ds,m(W ) depends on both ε

m, ε

s values. Still it is analytic
in qB(0) with coefficients depending on given robustness level , since ε

m,−m ∈ [±].
We denote associated roots of such functions for every pairm,−m in qB(0) by qm,−mB (){z}
where z is the index of the root such that qm,−mB (){z + 1} > qm,−mB (){z} . The full cer-
tainty case is recovered with → 0.
We next formulate the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 (Social welfare algebraization under uncertainty).
The outcome s ∈ F of the r&d game is socially optimal among outcomes F ⊆ O under
robustness level  if qB(0) lies in the union of intervals where social welfare is higher under
outcome s than under any other m ∈ F , i. e. there exists the choice function:
Ψ(F) : qB(0) ∈
⋃
m∈F
⋂
m∈F
[qs,mB (){z}; qs,mB (){z + 1}] :
Ds,m(W ) ≥ 0 =⇒
Ψ(F) = arg max
m∈F
min
ε∈[−;]
W εm(qB) = s. (16)
The outcome of the game s is robust welfare maximizing up to the level Ws if ∀ < Ws :
Ψ(F) = s.
Proof. As long as the worst-case outcome s is better than the worst-case outcome m for
given , it follows that Ds,m(W ) ≥ 0. These objects are analytic functions in qB(0),
depending on robustness  thus roots qs,mB (ε

s,m){z} form a sequence of intervals where
outcome s is social welfare improving or not over m. Select those ranges of qB(0) which
yield positive value for this polynomial. Repeat this process for all m ∈ F . Outcome s
is better than any collection of other outcomes from F as long as all differences Ds,m(W )
are positive (since Def. 1). Ranges of qB(0) where this condition remains valid are given
by the union of all intervals associated with positive difference for all Dm,s(W ). Union of
those intervals gives the total range, where outcome s is better than any m ∈ F hence
(16). The last claim is just an observation that choice function depends on the uncertainty
level: once we change , it could be the case that qB(0) no longer lies in intervals of positive
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sign and outcome s is no longer maximizing worst-case welfare (although it still can be
optimal in full certainty case).
This proposition gives the criteria for comparing any regimes in terms of social welfare
of the R&D game for fixed : we need to compute values W m , and then compare them
for the given qB(0). As long as the difference between m,−m functions W is positive,
regime m is robust welfare improving over regime −m. Thus computing roots of this
difference provides the range of qB(0), for which this ordering holds. Since  is fixed,
these roots are functions of parameters and uncertainty level. Thus for any given error
size we can establish the ordering or regimes of the underlying r&d game in terms of
social welfare. Formally speaking the relationship (16) provides a selector function in the
space of functions type Dm,−m(W ): once the condition of positive difference is fulfilled, it
checks whether given qB(0) falls into one of the provided intervals.
Observe also, that the choice of robust optimal regime depends both on the size of the
set F and the noise level : it could be the case that competitive outcome is better than
strategic forestall for any , but not so if comparing with the monopolistic development.
We also need the robust criteria of individual optimality. It is done in the same way
as for social welfare, albeit for profit functionals of the players. Denote by Πmj (ε) total
profit of player j in regime m under uncertainty level ε. Observe that this is valid only
for social planner, since players do not experience uncertainty at all.
Definition 2 (Robust outcome of the r&d game).
The outcome i of the r&d game is believed to be (weakly) individually optimal across
(feasible) outcomes F ⊆ O for the leader j with robustness , if
arg max
m∈F
min
ε∈[;]
Πmj (ε) = i (17)
It coincides with actual realization (the belief is robust)
arg max
m∈F
Πmj = i = arg max
m∈M
min
ε∈[;]
Πmj (ε) (18)
if it is strongly individually optimal:
arg max
m∈F
min
ε∈[;]
{Πij(ε)− Πmj (ε)} = i (19)
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This definition provides the criteria for a planner, how to define which regime of the
game to expect in the absence of regulation. Still, as the second part points out, the
believed regime is not always the actual one, so there is a room for mistake which is that
higher, the higher is .
Corollary 1 (Algebraization of robust outcomes of the r&d game).
The outcome i ∈ F of the r&d game is expected to realize among outcomes M ⊆ O with
robustness level  if δ(0) lies in the union of intervals where worst-case profit is higher
under outcome s than under any other m ∈M for player j (denoted as the leader), i. e.
there exists the choice function:
Θ(F) : δ(0) ∈
⋃
m∈F
⋂
m∈F
[δjm(){z}; δjm(){z + 1}] :
min
ε∈[−;]
{Πij(ε)} − min
ε∈[−;]
{Πmj (ε)} ≥ 0 =⇒
Θ(F) = arg max
m∈M
min
ε∈[−;]
Πmj (ε) = i. (20)
The outcome i is the robust realization of the r&d game with certainty level Oi if
∀ < Oi : Θ(F) = i.
Proof. Amounts to application of results of Prop. 2 to the value functions of the under-
lying r&d game.
3.3 Robust subsidies under uncertainty
The social planner may implement the policy scheme consisting of the subsidy and its
duration to one of the players to prevent strategic behavior. Under full certainty the first-
best subsidy might be implemented, but under the uncertain potentials of technologies
this is not the case. The implementation of a subsidy follows multiple steps:
1. Social welfare is computed for all possible regimes of the game, and the best one in
the sense of Prop. 2 is selected;
2. The expected regime of the game is defined via Cor. 1;
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3. Subsidy is assigned to one of the players in such a way, as to incentivize players to
switch to the desired regime;
4. Social welfare for the resulting regime (subsidized) is computed and checked against
the otherwise realised non-perturbed regime and profit incentives of players in the
resulting regime.
We thus require the subsidy to be robust and social-welfare improving, but not neces-
sarily optimal. Under uncertainty the planner does not know profit incentives of players,
but only expected ones subject to the error ε. Hence the definition of socially desirable
robust subsidy:
Definition 3 (Robust welfare-optimal policy scheme).
We call a policy scheme the pair Σk : {σk, tk} which defines size and duration of the
subsidy assigned to player B for certainty.
For each  the robust welfare-improving policy scheme Σk(i, s) switching the game from
i to s is characterized by following:
1. Regime i is expected to realize without the subsidy in the sense of Def. 2 but regime
s is socially optimal in the sense of Def. 1
2. The policy scheme Σk is (weakly) social welfare-improving under uncertainty level
:
min
ε∈[−;]
{W εs (qB,Σk)} − min
ε∈[−;]
{W εi (qB)} ≥ 0 (21)
It is strongly welfare improving if
min
ε∈[−;]
{W εs (qB,Σk)−W εi (qB)} ≥ 0 (22)
3. The policy scheme is (weakly) robust under uncertainty level , if this policy allows
for the prevention of switching back from the subsidized regime in all cases considered
in Proposition 1:
∀m ∈ F : min
ε∈[−;]
{Πsj(Σk)} − min
ε∈[−;]
{Πmj (Σk)} ≥ 0 (23)
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It is strongly robust if
∀m ∈ F : min
ε∈[−;]
{Πsj(Σk)− Πmj (Σk)} ≥ 0 (24)
The policy scheme Σ∗ is (weakly) optimal among all (weakly) robust welfare-improving
policy schemes switching from i to s, Σk ∈ Σ(i, s) if
arg max
Σk∈Σ(i,s)
min
ε∈[−;]
{W εs (qB,Σk)} = Σ∗ (25)
It is strongly optimal if
arg max
Σk∈Σ(i,s)
min
ε∈[−;]
{W εs (qB,Σ∗)−W εs (qB,Σk)} = Σ∗ (26)
where by the argument Σk in social welfare we understand the social welfare obtained
under policy scheme Σk and by Π
s
j(Σ

k) the value for r&d firms obtained under the given
policy scheme in regime s6.
Robustness is thus understood in this paper as the ability of a policy to perform a
given task (prevention of strategic behavior) albeit crucial information is missing while
preserving the social welfare at least not lower than in the worst-case scenario under alter-
native regimes. This concept of robustness is close to the usual min-max approach, since
we use maximal confidence intervals for uncertainty and compare worst-case scenarios in
terms of welfare. At the same time our concept allows for immediate application due to
the the algebraization approach and can be used in the setting with many alternative
regimes of the model.
Since there are multiple regimes of the game, the set of robust and welfare improving
policy schemes will be different depending both on which regime is the target of subsidy
(where the planner wants the game to switch to) and on the actual realization (which
regime realizes in the absence of the planner), but policy schemes themselves are defined
independently of regimes of the game.
Thus to find an optimally robust subsidy in terms of Def. 3 social planner has to
define both the socially desirable outcome with the help of Prop. 2 and the regime of the
6this is necessary since introduction of the subsidy changes both δ(t), qA,B(t) dynamics and thus values
for the planner and firms differ from those in regime m without subsidies
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game which would actually realize in a non-distorted case. Prop. 2 and Cor. 1 provide
tools necessary to define the starting position of a subsidy: where the system would go in
unperturbed case and where the planner wants it to go as well as the criteria for optimality
and robustness of it:
Corollary 2.
There is a need to subsidize regime s only if s = Ψ(F) 6= Θ(F) = i at  < Ws . Policy
scheme Σk is optimal and robust in switching from i to s at the level 
W
s in the sense of
Def. 3 only if
Ψ(F) = Ψ(FΣk) = Θ(FΣk) = s (27)
where FΣk denotes the set of feasible outcomes under the policy scheme Σk.
In our model it is not the case that simultaneous development of both technologies is
always socially desirable. We thus need a general criteria to select the appropriate policy
scheme among suitable (welfare-improving and robust) ones.
Moreover, so far we defined robust social welfare, profit incentives and criteria of choice
for policy schemes for a fixed level on uncertainty . It might happen that at some level
∗ one of the choice functions changes, i. e. predicts different outcome of the game as
socially optimal and/or profit maximizing. We thus arrive to robust policy thresholds:
Proposition 3 (Selection and ordering of robust policy schemes).
1. If there exists Rk (i, s) < 
W
s such that Θ>Rk (i,s)(FΣk) 6= Θ<Rk (i,s)(FΣk) = s, the
policy scheme Σk is robust in switching i to s up to level of uncertainty 
R
k (i, s),
otherwise it is globally robust for the pair i, s.
2. If there exists Sk (i, s) < 
W
s such that Ψ>Rk (i,s)(FΣk) 6= Ψ<Rk (i,s)(FΣk) = s, the policy
scheme Σk is welfare improving for s up to level of uncertainty 
S
k (i, s), otherwise it
is globally improving for the pair i, s.
3. Policy scheme Σk is admissible for the pair {i, s} only for  ≤ ∗k(i, s) = min{Rk (i, s), Sk (i, s)}.
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4. At any given  ≤ Ws , if the set Σ(i, s) def= {Σk}, k ∈ K of admissible policy schemes
switching the game from i to s is non-empty, then there exists the choice function
∃Λ(Σ(i, s)) : qB(0) ∈
⋃
Σk∈Σ(i,s)
⋂
Σk∈Σ(i,s)
[qx,kB (){z}; qx,kB (){z + 1}] :
min
ε∈[−;]
{WΣxs } − min
ε∈[−;]
{WΣks } > 0 =⇒
Λ(Σ(i, s)) = arg max
Σk∈Σ(i,s)
min
ε∈[−;]
{WΣks } = Σx (28)
selecting the best policy scheme Σx among those welfare-improving and robust ones
at the level .
5. Denote ∗1(i, s) = mink∈K{∗k(i, s)}, the uncertainty threshold of policy scheme Σx =
Λ(Σ<∗1(i,s)(i, s)). There exists an increasing sequence Ω
∗(i, s) = {∗1(i, s), .., ∗k(i, s), .., ∗K(i, s)}
of uncertainty thresholds for all policy schemes in Σ(i, s) such that the choice func-
tion Λ(Σ(i, s)) changes its value at each of them.
6. This forms a sequence of robust policy schemes increasing in uncertainty tolerance
level Σ∗(i, s) = {Σ∗11 , ..,Σ
∗
K
K } where each next element is more robust and welfare
optimal under given robustness level.
Proof. Two first points are just reflecting the fact that with growing uncertainty intervals
of definition for choice functions Ψ,Θ might shrink and at some point the previously
chosen element of the given set can become non-optimal. Third point refers to Def. 3
and indeed, as soon as one of choice functions Ψ,Θ changes its value, given policy scheme
either cannot perform the task of reaching the desired outcome of the game, either this
regime is not sustainable (robust). Point 4 requires a non-empty set, which exists due
to Corollary 2, otherwise there is no need for a subsidy. We associate to every policy
scheme from this set a welfare function. Their comparison provides the choice criteria for
Λ. Point 5 introduces the ordering in the set Σ(i, s) in welfare terms. Then we can also
construct an increasing sequence out of it. Point 6 follows from points 4 and 5.
The (28) is another choice function, which selects the policy scheme among those social
welfare improving and robust under . It selects the one which yields the highest welfare
under regime s in worst case once policy scheme is applied.
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The sequence of robust policy schemes is formed by increasing : once it crosses the
threshold ∗k(i, s) the choice function changes and selects another scheme. It is important
to note that these thresholds differ not only across schemes (which are independent of the
regime) but also across the switches {i, s}: a given policy scheme may be more robust
and/or welfare improving in one switching than in the other. These uncertainty thresholds
may be found through application of choice function Λ to different values of . There is
exactly the same number of thresholds as of welfare-improving robust policy schemes
for switch {i, s}. Naturally for full certainty case the set of uncertainty thresholds is a
singleton with ∗1 =∞ and the policy scheme with the highest welfare is selected.
Corollary 3 (Optimal robustness level).
Assume  < Ws . The level of robustness 
∗∗(i, s) = ∗k(i, s) is optimal for the switch {i, s},
if both
min
∗k
{WΣ
∗k
k
s } −min
∗k+1
{WΣ
∗k+1
k+1
s }+ ||min
∗k+1
{WΣ
∗k
k
s } −min
∗k+1
{WΣ
∗k
k
mk }|| ≤ 0,
min
∗k−1
{WΣ
∗k−1
k−1
s } −min
∗k
{WΣ
∗k
k
s }+ ||min
∗k
{WΣ
∗k−1
k−1
s } −min
∗k
{WΣ
∗k−1
k−1
mk−1 }|| ≥ 0,
mk = Θ∗k+1(MΣ
∗
k
k
) (29)
It is unique for any {i, s}.
Proof. Both lines in (29) are sums of welfare loss and gain from increasing the robustness
level by one threshold. The first term is the difference in worst-case welfare in regime s
under two successive schemes from Σ∗(i, s) under associated robustness thresholds. This
is always non-positive, since at every threshold the maximum welfare is selected. The
second term is the potential error from applying the preceding (less robust) scheme under
higher robustness level. There are two kinds of potential errors: either this scheme is no
longer worst-case welfare improving, or it is not robust. Both cases are described by the
difference under modulo operation and differ only in sign. Taking absolute value gives
positive value of error avoidance. Once the sum of those two terms is not increasing, there
is no further gain in increasing robustness level for the planner. Since the sequences of
thresholds and policies are increasing, this choice is always possible and unique one.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we propose a fairly general algorithm for finding optimal robust policies
aimed at support of newer technologies. The advantage of our approach in comparison
with the earlier ones is that it does not require anything except the axiom of choice and
the existence of the value for the underlying game to be formulated.
Starting with an arbitrary dynamic game with finite number of states measuring the
technologies’ development, we formulate the ordering of individually and socially preferred
outcomes based on the abstract notion of the choice function. The advantage of this
abstract approach is that a choice function for a finite collection of sets exists always once
axiom of choice is assumed.
Based solely on this notion we are able to find the ordering of robust policy schemes
derive the criterion for the selection of the most optimal one and formulate the concept
of the optimal robustness level relative to the uncertainty.
The approach proposed here can be applied to any dynamic game with finite number
of players and asymmetric uncertainty. In particular it may be applied to questions
of subsidizing green technologies, which are frequently characterized by the uncertain
potential and relative disadvantage in comparison with existing older technologies.
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